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PSYCHOLOGY IS A PECULIAR DISCIPLINE. 
Chemistry is the science that attempts to ex-
plain chemical phenomena. Zoology is the 
science that attempts to explain zoological 
phenomena. One might expect psychology of 
be the science that attempts to explain psy-
chological phenomena. But psychology, as 
practiced today, attempts rather to explain 
behavioral phenomena (including verbal be-
havior). Psychological notions enter its en-
deavor only as part of the explanans, not as 
part of the explanandum. In this psychology 
differs markedly from the bona fide sciences, 
such as chemistry and zoology, in the image 
of which psychologists have tried so deliber-
ately to cast their discipline.  
There is of course a perfectly understand-
able reason for this. The psychological phe-
nomena given to us pretheoretically are the 
phenomena manifest in the stream of con-
sciousness. Embarrassingly, these appear to be 
“private” and “publicly inaccessible”. The 
sense in which this is so is elusive but familiar. 
Right now I am visualizing a purple three-
wheeled dragon; I know that this is so in a way 
you do not. And if next I imagine something 
else, equally outlandish, and refuse to share 
the content of my visualization with anybody, 
then the following becomes true: there is a 
fact – part of the natural history of the uni-
verse – which is known to one person only. 
One could rightly call it a private fact. When 
in its introspectionist infancy psychology re-
ally dealt with the psychological phenomena, 
it dealt with facts of this sort. And this too 
marked it as very different from more estab-
lished sciences: the phenomena chemistry 
and zoology try to explain are public phe-
nomena, phenomena nobody can claim ex-
clusive access to or privileged authority over. 
So in search of phenomena more like those of 
chemistry and zoology, psychologists ended 
up training their powers on behavioral rather 
than psychological phenomena.  
Unfortunately, however, this strategic de-
cision does not make the psychological phe-
nomena disappear. A science targeting the 
psychological phenomena, rather than behav-
ioral phenomena, is still needed by anyone 
who would like to see science produce a truly 
comprehensive account of the world. If the 
name “psychology” is to be reserved to the sci-
ence that tries to explain behavioral phenom-
ena, then some other name is needed for the 
science that attempts to explain the psycho-
logical phenomena, that is, the phenomena 
manifest in the stream of consciousness. 
The first task of that science would be to 
describe the phenomena it attempts to ex-
plain. The task of explaining the phenomena 
can only come later, when the phenomena in 
need of explanation have been suitably de-
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scribed. Compare zoology again. The book 
Owls of the World1 more or less consolidates 
and summarizes humanity’s knowledge 
about the 250-odd species of owl inhabiting 
the earth. Much of it involves trying to ex-
plain owl phenomena: typical food and hunt-
ing styles, social behavior and communica-
tion, breeding habits, migration patterns, 
DNA structure, etc. But much of the book – 
and apparently, of the owl zoologist’s worka-
day – is taken up with just describing owls. 
The heart of the book consists of 72 color 
plates with drawings of hundreds of different 
types of owls (different species, genders, and 
ages), with next to them descriptions in the 
following style: 
 
Marsh Owl Asio capensis 
 
Grassland, marsh and moorland, from 
lowlands up to 3000m. Locally in NW and 
sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar. Me-
dium-sized, long-winged and dark-eyed 
owl, dark brown above, with dark brown 
and white face, dark brown chest and 
somewhat paler underparts; tarsi feath-
ered, toes bristled; bill black, eyes brown.2 
 
As noted, there are hundreds of these, 
making up the core of the book. On reflec-
tion, this makes perfect sense: it is all very 
well to want to explain, but first you need to 
get clear on what needs explaining. That is, 
before you launch into an explanatory pro-
ject, you need to describe the explanandum. 
My book The Varieties of Consciousness3 
was born out of concern for the counterpart 
descriptive project for a science whose ulti-
mate goal would be the explanation of the 
phenomena manifest in the stream of con-
sciousness. I wanted to address in the book 
the preliminary task of describing the phe-
nomenon in need of explanation. It is after all 
a curious feature of philosophical work on 
consciousness that by far most of its “re-
search energy” goes into explaining con-
sciousness (mostly what is at issue is reduc-
tive explanation of consciousness in terms of 
underlying neural substrate), without paus-
ing first to put in place a sound description of 
the explanandum. In a way, what my book 
does is pause for some 300 pages on the mat-
ter of describing consciousness. At one level, 
the book offers a descriptive account of the 
phenomena of consciousness (at a certain 
level of abstraction). At a deeper level, how-
ever, that account is merely an illustration of 
how the relevant project might be pursued. 
The deeper goal is to put in place a frame-
work for pursuing the relevant project. 
 
 
 
In analytic philosophy of mind, discus-
sions of the phenomena manifest in the 
stream of consciousness have traditionally 
tended to focus on perceptual experience and 
the experience of pleasure and pain. More 
recently, analytic philosophers have devel-
oped increased interest in two less “sensory” 
types of conscious experience: (i) the experi-
ence of thought, judgment, or more generally 
“cognition” and (ii) the experience of will, 
motivation, and more generally “agency”. 
Debates have accordingly arisen regarding 
the status of “cognitive phenomenology”4 
and the “phenomenology of agency”.5 (In this 
literature, the term “phenomenology” does 
not refer to the philosophical program 
launched by Husserl, but to the experiential 
dimension of mental phenomena; my book 
follows this usage.) Such debates raise a more 
general question, namely: what is the mini-
mal number of types of phenomenology we 
must admit to just be able to describe the 
stream of consciousness?  
One could insist that in fact only perceptu-
al and pain/pleasure (in a word: “algedonic”) 
phenomenology are needed. All other appar-
ent phenomenologies are either (i) fictions 
with no psychological reality in our stream of 
consciousness or (ii) mere combinations, or 
species, or combinations of species of percep-
tual and algedonic phenomenology. The first 
approach is eliminativist, the second reduc-
tivist. So according to this view, all further 
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apparent types of phenomenology are either 
eliminable or reducible. The only primitive, 
irreducible types of phenomenology are per-
ceptual and algedonic. In other words, the 
answer to the question “what is the minimal 
number of types of phenomenology we must 
admit to just be able to describe the stream of 
consciousness” is very simple: 2! My book’s 
starting point is that this view, which I call 
“mainstream stingy-ism”, is likely false: there 
are other kinds of sui generis phenomenology 
in our mental life. The book searches for the 
right number of “phenomenal primitives” at 
the same level of abstraction as perceptual 
and algedonic phenomenology.  
Not to keep the reader in suspense, I can 
confess immediately that my answer in the 
book is just as crude, but slightly more gen-
erous, than that of mainstream stingy-ism. I 
claim there are six such phenomenologies. 
These may be labeled as follows: perceptual 
phenomenology, algedonic phenomenology, 
imaginative phenomenology, cognitive phe-
nomenology, conative phenomenology, and 
contemplative phenomenology. You need all 
six to be able to fully describe (at the relevant 
level of abstraction) the stream of conscious-
ness. (You also need a great wealth of more 
specific kinds of phenomenology – involving 
subspecies of the six just listed – in order to 
completely fully describe consciousness. For 
example, you need not only the notion of 
perceptual phenomenology, but also the no-
tions of visual phenomenology, color phe-
nomenology, reddish phenomenology, scar-
let-ish phenomenology, and so on.)  
Let me explain what these six labels are 
supposed to stand for by organizing the six 
types of phenomenology along two axes. The 
first and more fundamental axe concerns the 
manner in which, or guise under which, the 
experience presents whatever it presents. (I 
assume here, and in the book, that all experi-
ences are presentational – there is something 
they are intentionally directed at. I recognize 
that this is not uncontroversial.) Consider 
the difference between consciously judging 
that you own a private jet and consciously 
desiring that you own a private jet. Both con-
scious states present the same state of affairs: 
your owning a private jet. But that state of 
affairs is presented differently in each. The 
conscious judgment presents it under the 
guise of the true (sub specie veri), whereas the 
conscious desire presents it under the guise 
of the good (sub specie boni). Observe, now, 
that merely contemplating, or entertaining, 
that you have a private jet is a more neutral 
kind of experience: you take a stand neither 
on the truth nor on the goodness of your 
owning a private jet. In fact, you take no 
stand at all – the state of affairs is simply pre-
sent before your mind. The way I put this in 
the book is as follows: consciously judging 
that p involves essentially presenting-as-true 
p; consciously desiring that p involves essen-
tially presenting-as-good p; entertaining that p 
involves essentially merely-presenting p. Cru-
cially, presenting-as-true is a phenomenal 
property, and the phenomenal property most 
essential to cognitive phenomenology; present-
ing-as-good is a phenomenal property, and the 
phenomenal property most essential to cona-
tive phenomenology; merely-presenting is a 
phenomenal property, and the phenomenal 
property most essential to the phenomenology 
of a slew of more neutral propositional atti-
tudes, such as entertaining, contemplating, 
considering, supposing, etc. It should be 
stressed that all these are attitudinal rather 
than content properties of conscious states, that 
is, properties these states have not in virtue of 
what they present but in virtue of how they pre-
sent whatever they present.  
A similar kind of three-way distinction, I 
claim, divides perceptual, algedonic, and imag-
inative phenomenology. Seeing a dog presents 
the dog under the guise of the real, though see-
ing that the dog is asleep presents that the dog is 
asleep under the guise of the true. Such states 
are oriented on the way things are, not the way 
things ought to be. Algedonic experiences, in 
contrast, present their objects under the guise 
of the good or bad: pleasure in a cup of coffee 
presents-as-good the coffee, while the pain at-
tendant on stubbing one’s toe presents-as-bad 
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the state of the toe. Meanwhile, imagining 
one’s toe stubbed can cause a certain discom-
fort, but does not itself constitute discomfort. 
Nor does imagining a dog constitute a percep-
tual experience of a dog, even if in some ex-
traordinary circumstances it might be confused 
for one. In itself, imagining a dog merely-
presents the dog. Thus perceptual phenome-
nology is the sensory analog of cognitive phe-
nomenology, algedonic phenomenology is in 
some sense the sensory analog of conative 
phenomenology, and imaginative phenome-
nology is the sensory analog of entertain-
ing/contemplative phenomenology. This 
brings up the second axe along which we can 
organize the six phenomenologies I claim are 
basic: some are sensory and some are nonsen-
sory. There is clearly a difference in the man-
ner in which the dog is presented in each 
case. Now, one might suggest various ways of 
capturing the deep difference between seeing 
a dog (or seeming to see a dog) and thinking 
of the very same dog (in his absence), but in 
any case the difference is real and can be put 
by saying that the seeing presents the dog 
sensorily whereas the thinking presents him 
nonsensorily.  
Superposing the two distinctions, we obtain 
six different attitudinal phenomenal properties. 
To a first approximation, we can capture their 
essential characters as follows: sensory-
presenting-as-true, sensory-presenting-as-good, 
sensory-mere-presenting, nonsensory-present-
ing-as-true, nonsensory-presenting-as-good, 
and nonsensory-mere-presenting. Each cap-
tures the most essential or central character of 
each of the aforementioned six basic types of 
phenomenology. 
 
 
 
This, then, is the substantive descriptive 
account of the (phenomena manifest in the 
stream of) consciousness I offer in the book. 
Because this account’s primary function is il-
lustrative, in that it is intended in the first in-
stance to show what a descriptive account of 
the phenomena looks like, the discussion in the 
book tends to be exploratory. Nonetheless, I 
try to offer a central argument for the phe-
nomenological reality and irreducibility of 
each of these six phenomenologies; or rather, 
for each of the four phenomenologies that go 
beyond the perceptual and the algedonic.  
The central mandate of Chap. 1 of the 
book is to develop an argument for a sui gene-
ris cognitive phenomenology – an experience 
of thinking or judging that something is the 
case that outstrips any perceptual or algedonic 
experience one might undergo when thinking 
and judging. As I mention in the chapter, I am 
particularly convinced of there being a sui 
generis cognitive phenomenology by the sim-
ple fact that otherwise life would be boring. It 
is hard to understand why one would even be 
engaged in philosophical activity if all one 
hoped to derive from such engagement is the 
experience of certain images. However, as I 
also note in the chapter, it is not yet clear to 
me how to turn this compelling observation 
into an argument. Instead, the chapter’s offi-
cial argument is based on a thought experi-
ment whose purpose is two-part: first, to 
paint forth with some detail the inner life of a 
person who lacks any sensory and algedonic 
experience but still undergoes thought pro-
cesses; then, to claim that this person’s inner 
life submits to the same “explanatory gap” 
problems that characterizes phenomenal 
consciousness so intimately. The person I im-
agine is a mathematically gifted but otherwise 
unfortunate woman named Zoe. Zoe is unfor-
tunate insofar as she is not only blind, and not 
only deaf, but in fact all her senses have 
stopped working at some point (and all epi-
sodic memory of past sensory experiences has 
disappeared as well). Furthermore, Zoe suffers 
from (congenital or acquired) analgesia – the 
condition in which a person does not experi-
ence pain – as well as its pleasure counterpart. 
And yet, due to her mathematical genius, her 
inner life is quite active: she spends her days 
trying to set up axioms, prove theorems, de-
fine terms, and so on. I argue first that Zoe is 
both conceivable and (metaphysically) possi-
ble. I then argue that we can ask all the same 
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questions about explanatory gap and hard 
problem with respect to Zoe’s inner life that 
we can with respect to yours and mine: how 
can a thousand electric pulses coursing 
through Zoe’s neurons just be the realization 
that a proof must go this way and not that? 
Such amenability to explanatory-gap con-
cerns, I suggest, is the mark of phenomenality.  
The argument, condensely put, is this: (1) 
a phenomenal property is an explanatory-
gap-able property; (2) some of Zoe’s cogni-
tive states have explanatory-gap-able proper-
ties; so, (3) some of Zoe’s cognitive states 
have phenomenal properties; but, (4) Zoe’s 
mental states do not have perceptual or 
algedonic phenomenal properties; therefore, 
(5) some of Zoe’s cognitive states have irre-
ducibly cognitive phenomenal properties, i.e., 
exhibit sui generis cognitive phenomenology.  
In Chap. 2, I provide an argument for a 
sui generis conative phenomenology. Here 
the style of argument is different – I proceed 
through a series of phenomenal contrasts. In 
arguments from phenomenal contrast, the 
existence of a phenomenal property P is es-
tablished by juxtaposing two experiences 
with the hope of (i) eliciting the strong intui-
tion that their overall phenomenal character 
is different and (ii) showing that the best ex-
planation of this overall phenomenal differ-
ence is that one experience exhibits P where-
as the other does not.  
In the chapter, I consider a series of po-
tential reductive accounts of the experience 
of doing something, or trying to do some-
thing, and produce contrast cases that, in 
each case, are supposed to elicit in the reader 
this kind of intuition (that is, an intuition 
that there is an overall phenomenal differ-
ence between that experience and various 
experiences that might be proposed as poten-
tial reducers). In particular, I argue that there 
is a felt difference between the experience of 
clenching one’s fist and the (i) the tactile ex-
perience of the different parts of one’s hand 
touching each other; (ii) the combination of 
(i) and the judgment that one has caused the 
hands’ parts to touch; (iii) the combination 
of (ii) and the visual awareness, if there is 
such, of one’s causal efficacy; (iv) the combi-
nation of (iii) and proprioceptive awareness 
of muscle contractions in one’s hands; (v) the 
combination of (iii) and proprioceptive im-
agery of those muscle contractions. The 
overall phenomenal difference shows that the 
experience of clenching one’s fist has more to 
it than any (combination) of these other ex-
periences. That “more” is the element of sui 
generis conative phenomenology, I claim. 
In the cognitive domain, the paradigmatic 
experience is that of making a judgment that p. 
In making the judgment that p, the essential 
character of the act as presenting-as-true the 
content p is particularly manifest. In the cona-
tive domain, I claim in Chap. 2, the paradig-
matic experiences are those of deciding to  
and trying to . Or perhaps better: there is a 
special kind of experience, that of deciding-
and-then-trying to do something, which I 
claim is paradigmatic in the conative domain 
– the character of presenting-as-good  is par-
ticularly manifest in this kind of experience. 
However, when we consider these two kinds of 
paradigmatic experience in the domain of con-
ceptual, nonsensory mental activity, we realize 
that there must be a third kind of phenomenal 
state, neither cognitive nor conative but on a 
par with those. The paradigmatic state of that 
kind is entertaining (the proposition p or the 
action ). The act of entertaining p, for exam-
ple, does not present-as-true p, but also does 
not present-as-good (the holding, or the bring-
ing about of) p. It merely presents p, without 
commenting either on its truth or on its good-
ness. Other conscious states of that kind in-
clude contemplating, considering, gra-sping, 
apprehending, and more. In Chap. 3, I argue 
that such states form a third kind of sui gene-
ris phenomenal state, irreducible to (any 
combination of) perceptual, algedonic, cog-
nitive, or conative states. The argument pro-
ceeds in two steps. In the first step, I argue 
that the kind of knowledge we have of our 
being in states of that type is the kind of 
knowledge characteristic of phenomenal 
states – immediate, noninferential know-
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ledge. This suggests that states such as enter-
taining p have a phenomenal character. In a 
second step, I consider a number of potential 
reducers of that phenomenal character and 
dismiss them. For example, I argue that the 
phenomenology of entertaining p is not the 
same the phenomenology of having 50% cre-
dence in p, nor the same as the phenomenol-
ogy of judging that possibly, p.  
In Chap. 4-5 of the book, I argue that emo-
tional experience and moral experience do not 
involve a sui generis phenomenal character at 
the relevant level of abstraction (though they 
may at a lower level of abstraction, say the one 
that corresponds to auditory [as opposed to 
perceptual] phenomenology). To round up 
my list of phenomenal primitives, I argue in 
Chap. 6 that imaginative experience involves a 
special and irreducible phenomenal character. 
In particular, I argue that imagining x and 
perceiving x have irreducibly different kinds 
of phenomenal character. To appreciate the 
claim, consider that there are three prima fa-
cie possibilities for difference between the 
phenomenologies of perception and the im-
agination: (1) there is no difference; (2) there 
is a difference of degree; (3) there is a differ-
ence of kind. The first view is that perceiving 
a particular dog and imagining him (in the 
same setting) have exactly the same phenom-
enology; the only difference is in the sur-
rounding beliefs: only the perception is ac-
companied by a belief that the dog is really 
there, or that the dog is being perceived, or 
something like that. The second view is that 
perception and imagination have the same 
kind of phenomenology, but perception has a 
sharper, or more vivid, or finer-grained ver-
sion of it. The third view is that the two have 
a different kind of phenomenology – there is 
a qualitative difference between seeing a dog 
and visualizing him. The third view is proba-
bly the least represented in the history of phi-
losophy, but it is the view I defend. In partic-
ular, I argue, to a first approximation, that 
whereas a perceptual experience of x pre-
sents-as-real x, an imaginative experience of 
x presents-as-unreal x. The phenomenology 
of perception and imagination, on this view, is 
not exhausted by the sensible features of what 
is experienced (the dog’s colors and shapes, 
say), or even by the “higher-level” properties 
of what is experienced (being a dog, being a 
beagle). It contains one more phenomenal fea-
ture, one which has nothing to do with what is 
experienced and has only to do with how it is 
experienced. That is the property of present-
ing-as-real in perception and presenting-as-
unreal in imagination. Naturally, you cannot 
reduce one of these features to the other. To 
that extent, imaginative experience involves a 
sui generis kind of (sensory) phenomenal 
character. 
 
 
 
In this way, my book attempts to provide a 
sustained argument for one particular answer 
to the question “what is the minimal number 
of types of phenomenology we must admit to 
just be able to describe the stream of con-
sciousness?” – “six”. But it must be confessed 
that in this area philosophical argumentation 
has a somewhat uncomfortable role.  
I think of the ideal scenario as one where 
a philosophical argument does not only com-
pel us rationally to accept some thesis, but 
actually makes us see why the thesis is true – 
it reveals to us, in a way, a truth that was pre-
viously invisible to us. I say this fully mindful 
of the fact that notions such as “seeing the 
truth” and “truth being revealed” require elu-
cidation. But something like it must exist. If 
you reflect a bit on the claim that if x  1, 
then 2-2x  1, you will come to see that it is 
true.6 After some reflection, a certain experi-
ential event takes place: the claim’s truth feels 
like it is revealed to you. Philosophical argu-
ments rarely manage to accomplish this, but 
it is the ideal case. For me, Kim’s argument 
from causal closure to reductive physicalism 
was such.7 For many, Armstrong’s argument 
from objective similarities to in re universals 
is such as well.8 Arguments that manage this 
feat are rare in philosophy, but many argu-
ments tend toward this ideal.  
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In the philosophy of consciousness, how-
ever, we are typically convinced of the truth of 
phenomenological claims on the strength of 
something like introspective revelation of their 
truthmaker (the conscious phenomenon it-
self). Accordingly, the arguments we provide 
do not attempt to reveal the actual reason why 
these claims strike us as, and are, true. For we 
feel as though the grounds of their truth are 
given to us directly, independently of the de-
liverances of discursive reason. The reader 
can appreciate the claim fully only if she sees 
for herself its truth – she must be visited by 
the relevant (private!) act of introspective 
revelation. What the arguments typically do, 
then, is clutch at some symptom of the rele-
vant truthmaker and try to exploit it to lead 
the reader to a kind of “blind” (i.e., not reve-
lation-based) acceptance of the phenomeno-
logical claim. The result is that the person 
providing the argument does not actually be-
lieve the argument’s conclusion on the basis 
of the argument she provides. This situation 
is perhaps not all that rare in philosophy, but  
it seems to be a fate in the philosophy of con-
sciousness. 
The arguments I present in the book are 
no exception. In some cases (notably my ar-
gument for irreducible cognitive phenome-
nology), I felt very clearly that any force my  
argument might have would not lie in its ca-
pacity to convert opponents, but rather in its 
capacity to put into words the convictions of 
proponents. My main hope, in any case, has 
been to construct  a  unified picture of  the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
realm of consciousness, where there are six 
elementary types of phenomenology struc-
tured along two axes (sensory/nonsensory 
and presenting-as-F) – and in doing so, to 
illustrate the kind of “descriptive” investiga-
tion that would be needed to underpin a sci-
ence of conscious phenomena.  
 
█  Acknowledgments 
 
This work was supported by the French Na-
tional Research Agency’s grants ANR-11-
0001-02 PSL* and ANR-10-LABX-0087.    
 
█  Notes 
 
1 See C. KÖNIG, F. WEICK, Owls of the World, Yale 
University Press, New Haven 2009. 
2 Ivi, p. 202. 
3 See U. KRIEGEL, The Varieties of Consciousness, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford/NewYork 2015. 
4 See T. BAYNE, M. MONTAGUE (eds.), Cognitive 
Phenomenology, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2011. 
5 See T. BAYNE, The Phenomenology of Agency, in: 
«Philosophy Compass», vol. III, n. 1, 2008, pp. 1-21. 
6 See E. CHUDNOFF, Phenomenal Contrast Argu-
ments for Cognitive Phenomenology, in: «Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research», vol. XC, 
n. 2, 2015, pp. 82-104. 
7 See J. KIM, The Myth of Non-reductive Material-
ism, in: «Proceedings and Addresses of the Amer-
ican Philosophical Association», vol. LXIII, 1989, 
pp. 31-47. 
8 See D.M. ARMSTRONG, Nominalism and Real-
ism: Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. I, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978. 
